U.S. Pentagon Limits Ukraine’s Missile Strike Range

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The Pentagon has put in place a formal approval system that restricts Ukraine from using U.S.-supplied long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) for strikes inside Russian territory. The mechanism, in place since late spring 2025, requires direct authorization from the U.S. Defense Secretary before such operations can proceed, according to U.S. defense officials. At least one Ukrainian request for approval has been declined under this policy.

The restriction also applies to certain allied systems, including British-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which rely on U.S. targeting data. This change marks a reversal of the policy late in the Biden administration, which had permitted Ukraine to conduct limited strikes inside Russia following an escalation in the conflict.

U.S. officials have stated that the review system is intended to ensure civilian oversight of weapons supplied by Washington and to balance military support with strategic restraint. The requirement underscores a policy approach designed to safeguard U.S. munitions from being used in ways that could expand the conflict without explicit approval.

In response, Ukraine has increased reliance on domestically developed capabilities, such as long-range drones and new missile systems including the Flamingo cruise missile. Ukrainian officials have said these weapons have enabled Kyiv to carry out deep strikes without external authorization, highlighting a shift toward greater self-reliance in military operations.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has continued to provide substantial support through conventional arms packages. A recent $850 million aid package included more than 3,000 Extended Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ERAMs), though the Pentagon confirmed their deployment is also subject to the approval framework.

The current administration has emphasized the importance of oversight and responsibility in foreign military aid while encouraging Ukraine’s capacity to develop and deploy its own systems. This dual approach reflects a strategy that limits direct U.S. involvement in offensive operations while reinforcing Ukraine’s responsibility for its own defense